The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff by Scherer, F. M
Book Reviews
The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff
Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective. By Richard A. Posner.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. Pp. x, 262. 515.00.
Reviewed by F. M. Scherert
For a Biblical seven years now Professor Posner has been writing in
the field of antitrust law and economics. This book' gathers the
harvest together, with diverse revisions and extensions, to provide an
integrated view of his thoughts. The picture is not comforting. He
expresses "a thorough dissatisfaction with the existing state of anti-
trust"-2 and, after chiding Supreme Court Justices for their "extra-
ordinary unwillingness or inability . . . to apply economics or any
other body of systematic thinking to antitrust problems,"'3 recommends
repeal of all the antitrust laws except § 1 of the Sherman Act.4
How came Posner to be so out of phase with the traditional wisdom?
As a fellow Federal Trade Commission (FTC) veteran, I may have a
clue. From 1963 to 1965 he was a clerk to then-Commissioner Philip
Elman. Oral tradition at the FTC has it that, among other things,
Posner helped Mr. Elman draft the Commission's opinion in the
Clorox merger case.5 From experience I can well understand his dis-
may and self-searching upon learning, presumably much later, that
certain of the opinion's factual foundations rested on quicksand.0 At
any rate, somewhere on the road to Chicago Posner must have had a
t Professor of Economics, Northwestern University; Director, Bureau of Economics,
Federal Trade Commission, 1974-1976.




4. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. V 1975). See pp. 7, 212, 216.
5. In re Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 127 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) X-1 (1963), rev'd, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
6. See Peterman, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 11 J.L. &
ECON. 321, 343-67, 396 (1968) (criticizing FTC's claim that television networks gave dis-
counts to large volume advertisers).
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vision, and the converted trust buster is now an ardent spokesman for
the new unorthodoxy.
In embracing this new cause Posner has equipped himself with an
arsenal of the economist's weapons. This is hardly accidental, for, as
Posner argues, the "essential intellectual tool" for a needed rethinking
of antitrust "is the science of economics. '' 7 One must, however, dis-
tinguish between substance and style. The substance of Posner's book
is for the most part economics, and, within its natural limitations, it is
in general adequately handled. But Posner's style is that of advocacy,
which, although hardly unknown among economists, is much more the
lawyer's stock in trade. Resorting to a technique I encountered with
alarming frequency at the FTC, Posner tells only one side of a com-
plex story. Facts, theories, and cases inconsistent with his argument
are overlooked or swept aside.
Many of Posner's criticisms of antitrust are at least partly valid.
The way Posner presses his argument, however, leaves this reader at
best unpersuaded; and at worst, it spurs me to take up arms against
the heresies. Since combating heresies is a time-honored function of
book reviewers, it will, despite the risk of imbalance, constitute the
bulk of what follows. Following a skeptical initial evaluation of the
basic premises of Posner's antitrust unorthodoxy, I consider critically
Posner's treatment of three substantive topics-collusion, mergers, and
divestiture. Occasional digressions correct minor tangential errors en-
countered along the way. A final conciliatory note on procedure sug-
gests the many areas in which Posner and I are in substantial agree-
ment.
I. The Goals of Antitrust
Let us begin with fundamentals-the goals of antitrust. I am im-
pelled at the outset to offer a dual confession. First, I have never read
the complete record of congressional debates underlying passage of the
Sherman Act, or for that matter, any other antitrust act. It is there-
fore with some unease that I raise doubts concerning Posner's inter-
pretations of congressional intent.
Second, perhaps because of this first lacuna, I spent two years as an
FTC bureau head not knowing exactly what we were supposed to be
accomplishing. To be sure, I had my own impressions, stemming in
part from my training (at Harvard, not Chicago) as an economist. My
staff (including a Chicago-trained Assistant Director for Antitrust
7. P. 3.
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Economics) added a few more; and from the several commissioners and
sundry congressional committees came an abundance of further guid-
ance. The trouble was that the signals did not form any coherent
pattern. Was Congress truly serious about our probing the bounds of
§ 5 of the FTC Act s in order to fragment concentrated industries? At
what cost? In recommending merger cases to the Commission, what
weight, if any, should be given to efficiencies? Did we really want to
challenge price discrimination that led to lower consumer prices? Vhat
if prices were lower in the short run but as a result were likely to be
higher over the longer haul? Did the food processing and distribution
industries in fact warrant special attention despite the press of ap-
parently more serious competitive breakdowns? I frequently felt that
if we only knew precisely where we were to go, we could proceed
there in a more orderly fashion. But clear objectives were a luxury we
seldom enjoyed; ambiguity was our guiding star.
In his book Professor Posner sets matters straight. Relying heavily
upon Professor Bork's survey,9 he observes that "[t]he framers of the
Sherman Act appear to have been concerned mainly with the price
and output consequences of monopolies and cartels."' 0 To those who
discern in addition congressional intent to protect small businesses,
Posner argues that the Act's provisions contradict that goal. For ex-
ample, Posner contends that small businesses thrive best under the
umbrella of monopoly pricing," though he does not demonstrate that
this insight was shared by the Sherman Act framers. There is also a
brief argument expressing doubt "that monopolists are in general less
vigorous innovators than competitive firms."' - The upshot is Posner's
basic tenet that "although noneconomic objectives are frequently men-
tioned in the legislative histories, it seems that the dominant legisla-
tive intent has been to promote some approximation to the economist's
idea of competition, viewed as a means toward the end of maximizing
efficiency.""3 On this conclusion rests his entire "economic approach
... to the interpretation as well as revision of the antitrust statutes.' 4
As I have indicated, I can claim no special insight into what Senator
Sherman and his colleagues had in mind. My impression from reading
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
9. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
10. P. 23.
11. P. 19.
12. P. i7; see p. 205. The mass of theory and evidence on this issue, see Kamien &




Vol. 86: 974, 1977
The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff
Thorelli's magisterial account 15 and the footnotes in Bork's article',
is that congressional views, not atypically, were muddled and often
contradictory. Still, several key points seem clear. First, the legislators
definitely had mixed emotions about the trusts. They believed that
large, market-dominating enterprises might achieve superior efficiency,
and they wished to retain those advantages while avoiding the as-
sociated abuses. 17 Second, Congress's sentiments were definitely what
we would now call consumerist, although there was also concern over
preventing monopsonistic exploitation of input suppliers (such as
farmers and oil-well owners). Third, the trusts were perceived as harm-
ful to consumers because they increased prices by restraining output.'"
This third point is crucial to Posner's argument, for price raising
and output restriction together lie at the heart of economists' notion
of monopolistic inefficiency. 19 Yet I do not believe one can support
the logical leap that because Congress recognized these propensities of
monopoly, it was concerned with "economic efficiency" in the modern
sense of the term. At the time the Sherman Act was passed, a precise
notion of allocative efficiency was just beginning to take shape through
the work of leading economic theorists.2 0 To be sure, Congress took
exception to monopoly output restriction, elevated prices, and bloated
profits, but it could hardly have known or understood how, by dis-
torting relative price signals, monopoly causes a reduction in ag-
gregate consumers' and producers' surplus. Nor would Congress have
been much impressed by the threat of such a reduction if it had been
15. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 164-232 (1954). Thorelli's conclusions,
'id. at 214-17, are particularly pertinent.
16. Bork, supra note 9. Bork's thesis, however, is that there was a clear legislative
intent to promote efficiency. Id. at 7 n.l.
17. This ambiguity is captured nicely in the words of Mr. Dooley, characterizing
Teddy Roosevelt's early attitude: "'Th' trusts,' says he, 'are heejoous monsthers built up
be th' enlightened intherprise iv th' men that have done so much to advance progress in
our beloved country,' he says. 'On wan hand I wud stamp thim undher fut; on th' other
hand not so fast.'" H. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT 172 (rev. ed. 1956).
18. In this respect Congress's analysis of monopoly was no more sophisticated than
that of Adam Smith a century earlier: "The monopolists, by keeping the market con-
stantly under-stocked, by never fully supplying the effectual demand, sell their com-
modities much above the natural price, and raise their emoluments, whether they con-
sist in wages or profit, greatly above their natural price." A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 61 (Modern Library ed. 1937).
19. Pp. 10-13.
20. The notion of a "deadweight welfare-loss triangle" entered the mainstream of
Anglo-American economics in the first edition of Marshall's Principles. A. MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF EcoNoMIcs 447 n.l (1st ed. 1890). An obscure English-language precursor
was Jenkin, On the Principles lVhich Regulate the Incidence of Taxes, reprinted in
R-EADINGS IN THE EcoNoMIcs OF TAXATION 227, 233 (R. Musgrave & C. Shoup eds. 1959)
(originally published in 1871). A variant of the concept can be traced to Dupuit, On
the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works, translated in 2 INT'L EcoN. PAPERS 83,
108 (A. Peacock, et al. eds. 1952) (originally published in French in 1844).
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familiar with the quantitative estimates of monopoly welfare loss first
made by Harberger 21 and later (with varying results) by other
researchers. To use a comparison that would have appealed to the
distinguished legislators in 1890, most such estimates of the annual
welfare loss to producers and consumers translate to not much more
than the price of one bottle of good Kentucky bourbon per capita..2 2
Professor Posner is well aware of this last embanassment. He tries to
elude it through a bold assertion: What might otherwise be monopoly
profits, and hence redistributions of wealth without clear efficiency
connotations, are transformed into costs as entrepreneurs compete for
monopoly positions or for a larger share of an established monopoly's
rewards..2 3 In the book under review this assertion is made without
any supporting evidence; the skeptical reader is referred in a footnote
to an earlier article by Posner. Upon consulting the article, he finds
that the postulated transformation takes place by assumption; only a
few scraps of indirect and anecdotal evidence are offered in support.2
In its weak form-i.e., as a hypothesized tendency-this idea is neither
new nor empirically implausible. To the extent that monopoly profits
are indeed so transformed, the indictment of monopoly as inefficient
takes on much greater weight.2-
At times in his book, however, and more consistently in his prior
article, Posner implies that all monopoly profits are converted into
costs. 20 This requires, as Posner recognizes,2 7 free entry with perfect
foresight or the absence of diminishing returns in the acquisition of
monopoly position.28 The realism of these assumptions as such is
arguable, and observation of real-world industries reveals that monop-
oly profits exist in abundance, so they can hardly have been trans-
21. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, in Papers and Proceedings of the
66th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 44 Am. EcoN. REV., May
1954, at 77.
22. The quantitative estimate is adapted from F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKEr SmRVC-
TURE AND Ecoyomic PERFORMANCE 402 (1970), which surveys the literature up to 1968.
More recently there has been a debate over whether, at least in theory, the early
estimates may have been much too low. See Bergson, On Monopoly Welfare Losses, 63
Am. ECON. REV. 853 (1973); Carson, On Monopoly Welfare Losses: Comment, 65 AM.
EcoN. REV. 1008 (1975); Worcester, On Monopoly Welfare Losses: Comment, id. at 1015;
Bergson, On Monopoly Welfare Losses: Reply, id. at 1024.
23. Pp. 11-13. Posner refers specifically to costs engendered by nonprice competition
(e.g., one cartel member's efforts to provide better service than another). The value of
such competition to consumers, Posner argues, is less than its cost. Pp. 12-13 & n.5.
24. See Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POLITICAL ECON.
807, 809-10 (1975).
25. See F. ScHEaRE, supra note 22, at 404-08.
26. See, e.g., pp. 15, 18, 52; Posner, supra note 24, at 809.
27. Posner, supra note 24, at 809.
28. See Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competition, 76 J. POLITICAL ECON. 149 (1968).
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formed entirely into costs. It suggests utter disregard for evidence to
state baldly, as Posner does, that "[t]here is no reason to think that
monopoly has a significant distributive effect. Consumers' wealth is
not transferred to the shareholders of monopoly firms; it is dissipated
in the purchase of inputs into the activity of becoming a monopolist. -2 9
If a considerable fraction of monopoly gains is not transformed into
costs and if, as I believe, Congress was concerned at least as much with
income distribution effects (which were well-understood in 1890) as
with efficiency effects (which were not), Posner's monolithic efficiency-
maximization approach to antitrust loses considerable logical force.
Certainly some of the knottier problems with which our staff grappled
during my tenure at the FTC were those in which efficiency considera-
tions pointed toward one course of action and distributive ones toward
an alternative. We might have welcomed a simple, overriding goal to
resolve our difficulties, but to insist that only efficiency mattered
would, in my judgment, have been less than faithful stewardship to
the (admittedly ambiguous) will of Congress.
Even if efficiency were accepted as the sole goal of antitrust, Posner's
analysis would contain important ambiguities. Whether for exposi-
tional convenience 30 or some more fundamental reason, Posner ap-
pears to view the condition for achieving economic efficiency as the
equality of price with long-run marginal costs under equilibrium
conditions.3' When a market is not in long-run equilibrium, as is al-
most always the case, it is not evident what Posner would do. The
(usually implicit) assumption of most welfare economists is that short-
run marginal-cost pricing is optimal and that, unless there are peculiar
cobweb effects or inexhaustible economies of scale, it will also lead
to equalization of long-run marginal cost and price. Posner shows no
recognition of this and, in a discussion of "overproduction" and the
information problems confronting sellers that is confusing if not con-
fused, 32 he seems to have no idea of how a competitive market attains
short-run equilibrium. I can think of no surer way to immobilize an
antitrust agency than instructing it to enforce competition under all
but disequilibrium conditions; yet this is what Posner seems to
suggest.33
29. Posner, supra note 24, at 821.
30. P. 239.
31. P. 136.
32. Pp. 136-37, 141-42.
33. This is my inference from Posner's continuing emphasis on efficiency goals in
antitrust and from his statement that constraining price to cost (presumably long-run
marginal cost) when there has been an unexpected increase in demand would result in
an inefficient allocation of resources. Pp. 136-37. A purely competitive market would
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One final point on goals. Posner dismisses as inappropriate or un-
necessary certain "sociopolitical" rationales for antitrust-notably, the
encouragement of small business and the aversion to monopolists'
alleged tendency to manipulate political processes. The small business
argument is rejected, as noted already, in the belief that monopolists'
umbrella pricing helps small firms survive and grow, 4 the manipula-
tion argument because monopolists presumably play politics to facili-
tate pricing behavior already deemed undesirable on efficiency
grounds. 35
Though it could scarcely have escaped his notice, Posner com-
pletely ignores another goal: the diffusion and decentralization of
power as an end in itself.30 Professor Bork strained to interpret the
legislative history otherwise, but it is not hard to infer such intent
from Sherman Act coauthor Edmunds's allusions to trusts as "grinding
tyrannies" and Senator Hoar's complaint that the "great monopolies
- . . are a menace to republican institutions." 37 Consider Senator
Sherman's statement in the principal speech supporting his 1890 bill:
If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not
endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of
any of the necessaries of life. If we would not submit to an em-
peror we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power
to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity.38
Much more recently, the late Senator Hart eloquently stated the case
for controlling business power per se when he introduced his "no-
fault monopolization" bill:"9
The [desire] of the Founding Fathers to prevent the accumula-
tion of power was born in large part of the experience of living
under a monarch with too much power. Not surprisingly, given
the commerce flourishing at the time, the question of economic
power was not addressed in the Constitution. So, while we have
relied on the Constitution to protect the individual from the
power of Government .... [the] control of economic power has
adjust by expanding output until short-run marginal cost (not mentioned by Posner in
this context) rises to equal the bid-up price. Unless marginal cost functions are dis-
continuous, this equality, contrary to Posner's assertion at p. 136, will hold for all sellers,
not just the marginal seller.
34. P. 19.
35. Pp. 18-19.
36. See C. KAYSrN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 5, 14-15, 17-18 (1959).
37. Bork, supra note 9, at 43.
38. 21 CoNG. REC. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
39. S. 3429, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S7153 (daily ed. May 13, 1976).
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been left to the forces of competition and to antitrust laws to keep
those forces vigorous.
In theory, the Constitution and antitrust laws take the same
approach to controlling power-a diffusion of power centers and
reliance on competition rather than a decree to determine the
value of an idea or product. 40
If this is what the people speaking through their elected representa-
tives want, Professor Posner cannot dismiss it as a goal of antitrust re-
form by ignoring it. And if such a goal has already been assimilated
into antitrust law, as one might infer from some of the judicial deci-
sions Posner criticizes, there is a remedy identified by President Taft:
[I]t is impossible that such a function as [antitrust adjudication]
could be performed by judges, who are only men, without at times
exceeding their just discretion, without at times stepping over
the line which is very hard to draw between judicial construction
and judicial legislation. But it must always be remembered that
the legislature has complete power in this regard, and that if the
courts in their construction of law miss the intention of the legisla-
ture there is immediate relief at hand in a new law which may be
made more clearly to set forth the legislative will.41
Thus, if the courts have strayed beyond the bounds of the efficiency
criterion Professor Posner considers so important, and if this is not
what Congress wants, one wonders why Congress has not intervened.
Posner provides no explanation. His case for a monolithic efficiency
approach suffers as a result.
II. The Substance of Antitrust: Collusion
Posner condemns collusive price fixing because it causes inefficient
resource allocation. To combat it he would retain § 1 of the Sherman
Act, but with significant amendments. He criticizes existing § 1 en-
forcement for punishing the attempt to fix prices instead of the
result-i.e., the actual restriction of output. This misdirection, he
believes, has two unfortunate consequences. First, enforcement re-
sources are frittered away attacking manifest conspiracies that, because
of unfavorable market structure or other conditions, have little chance
of materially influencing outputs and prices.4 2 Second, the need to
prove some overt conspiratorial action allows much effective collusion
40. 122 CONG. Rrc. S7152 (daily ed. May 13, 1976).
41. IV. TAFT, THE ANTI-TRusT AcT AND THE SUPREME COURT 36 (1914).
42. Pp. 40-41.
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to go unprosecuted because respect for interdependence and informal
modes of communication are sufficient to sustain restraint or, more
frequently, because the firms involved are able to cover the tracks of
actual conspiratorial meetings. 43
Posner would reverse the emphasis on conspiracy, eliminating, inter
alia, the requirement that illegality be inferred only when there are
cooperative acts going beyond "individual business judgment moti-
vated by the desire for maximum revenue." 4' He would instead
advocate price-fixing liability whenever a meeting of minds on a non-
competitive price can be inferred. 45 This in turn would be accom-
plished through a two-stage determination: first, whether market
conditions are propitious for the emergence of collusion and, only
after that is shown, whether such collusive pricing in fact exists.46
Economic evidence would be stressed, with the Government bearing a
heavy burden of proof to compensate for the greater possibility of
error in interpreting such evidence. Posner would simultaneously elim-
inate prison sentences for § 1 convictions and tailor corporate fines to
approximate the estimated economic costs imposed by collusion
divided by the probability of its detection.
Posner's proposed approach is an interesting one that would do
much, inter alia, for the already relatively satisfactory welfare of my
chosen profession. Its most attractive feature, as Posner stresses, is that
if it worked it would solve the "oligopoly problem" that has for a
long time been an open sore on the corpus of antitrust law.47 Specif-
ically, if the tendency of concentrated industries to maintain prices at
supracompetitive levels through purely tacit coordination could be
controlled by the result-oriented enforcement Posner proposes, there
might be less demand for the controversial alternative: an intensified
campaign to fragment oligopolistic industry structures.
On two broad counts, however, I am skeptical whether Posner's
approach would work. First, I doubt that the power of economic
analysis has advanced so far that his two-stage determination is feasible.
The first stage depends on our limited ability to predict the likelihood
of supracompetitive prices from the kinds of structural indicia identi-
fied by Posner-e.g., high seller concentration, low demand elasticity,
slow entry, standardized products, atomistic buyer structure, static
43. Pp. 52-55, 71-72.
44. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 542 (1954).
45. P. 75.
46. P. 55.
47. See C. KAYsu., & D. TuaRa, supra note 36, at 110.
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demand, and a high ratio of fixed to variable costs. 48 While I was with
the FTC we had an active effort to identify potential price-fixing
cases using only such structural evidence. The kindest thing I can say
about the effort is that it was a resounding flop-partly because of
severe data limitations and partly because our staff lacked the insight
or imagination to hold its conceptual divining rod in the right posi-
tion.
The second stage of Posner's approach assumes that the existence of
collusive pricing can be inferred with a high degree of confidence from
such indicia as stability of market shares, persistent price discrimina-
tion, divergent regional price patterns, identity of bids, profitability,
and the like.49 Granted, with enough strong evidence of this type,
a competent economist could in good conscience testify that even
though no meetings in smoke-filled rooms were proved, it was quite
unlikely prices could have been set as observed had there been no tacit
restrictive understanding. The trouble is, economic analysis is an
elastic instrument and, I am sorry to report, some economists' con-
sciences are also elastic, so one can find economists who with apparent
conviction will explain away any pattern of behavior, however bizarre,
as the consequence of special but highly competitive industry circum-
stances. Sometimes they may even be right, if there exists any absolute
measure of "right" in such complex matters. Every tacit collusion case
under Posner's scheme would be a "big case," drawing teams of econo-
mists to ply the courts with their expert but conflicting opinions.5 0 In
the end, the decision would turn significantly upon whose experts were
more credible. It would not, I fear, be a system highly likely to yield
either truth or justice, especially when private respondents pay $1,000
per day for "credibility" (including extensive preparation) while the
Government is limited to $150 or (in exceptional cases) $250.
My second difficulty with Posner's § 1 proposal is that, if I under-
stand him correctly, conviction under his new approach would require
more than a supported inference that a price-fixing agreement, per-
haps tacit, existed. He indicates that there must be "serious limitations"
of output or a substantial elevation of prices above competitive levels.5 '
"The antitrust enforcers," he says in a different but related context,
"have more serious things to worry about than trivial departures from
48. P. 55.
49. Pp. 62-71.
50. Certain procedural reforms advocated by Posner would alleviate but not eliminate
these "big case" problems. See pp. 1001-02 infra.
51. P. 42; cf. p. 166 (discussing lack of "tools for determining when a group of sellers
is maintaining a price that is above the competitive level").
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competitive pricing. ' '1 2 In other words, some rule concerning the
reasonableness of prices presumably is to be applied. Posner decries
the Supreme Court's shift to an attempt-oriented standard of collusion,
away from its stress on "the effect ... on the market price" 3 and from
its purported original requirement of a supported "inference that the
defendants were likely to succeed in raising the market price above
the competitive level. ' ' 54 This interpretation of the Supreme Court's
original position is consistent with the Court's Addyston Pipe opinion
of 1899, 55 which Posner footnotes in context. I find it hard to reconcile,
however, with the Trans-Missouri Freight Association decision two
years earlier, in which the majority rejected the argument that Con-
gress intended to outlaw only those agreements that were unreason-
able restraints. 56
More significantly, the courts of the 18 90s recognized more clearly
than Professor Posner the difficulty of ascertaining whether prices have
been elevated unreasonably. They therefore shunned setting sail upon
that "sea of doubt."57 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court noted in
Trenton Potteries,S the price that is reasonable today may under
tomorrow's changed business conditions become unreasonable. Im-
plementing Posner's policy would require a continuous monitoring of
prices and the repeated, excruciatingly difficult, determination of
whether an unreasonable elevation had occurred. The attendant litiga-
tion complexities are self-evident. I for one attach sufficient weight to
the goal of decentralizing power, private or governmental, that I take
an extremely dim view of having an antitrust agency armed with
criminal sanctions perform such a price-monitoring function. I would
rather see the antitrusters play "cops-and-robbers," as Posner puts it,59
searching for cases of explicit collusion.
III. The Substance of Antitrust: Mergers
Posner perceives antimerger law as a crude second-best solution to




55. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 235-38 (1899) (modifying
85 F. 271 (1898)).
56. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 328-42 (1897).
57. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (1898), modified, 175
U.S. 211 (1899); see United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 331-32
(1897).
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implemented, he believes, the Celler-Kefauver Act, which amended
§ 7 of the Clayton Act,61 could be scrapped and § 1 of the Sherman Act
could be used to stop mergers that would create a single dominant
firm with monopoly power. 62 This proposal turns on the feasibility
of his direct approach, but let us leave those problems behind us and
examine certain other aspects of his merger policy analysis.
Posner severely criticizes the economic analysis the Supreme Court
used to define relevant markets and evaluate anticompetitive effects
in several of its key merger decisions. 63 In much of this criticism I
concur without further comment. For reasons outlined earlier, he also
takes strong exception to the stress placed by the Supreme Court on
protecting small businesses through Celler-Kefauver Act enforcement-
e.g., in its Brown Shoe64 and Von's Grocery,3 decisions. Again I concur,
though with reservations.
I agree with Posner that a policy of protecting small businesses may
be futile. If small firms cannot hold their own in open competition
with larger enterprises, banning mergers that yield economies will
give small businessmen at best only a temporary reprieve, since the
most efficient firms will exploit other routes (notably, internal
growth) to expand their market shares. Indeed, a ban on mergers may
worsen small firms' positions, and not only because it decreases the
possibility of umbrella pricing emphasized by Posner. It seems clear,
for example, that the new, efficient plants built by the leading
American brewing companies, which were barred from expanding by
acquisition, have worsened the relative cost disadvantage of small
brewers and hastened their demise. 0 Medium-sized companies like
Falstaff and Associated, which grew by acquiring old plants (at least,
until the merger screws were tightened), later experienced significant
cost disadvantages vis-h-vis internally-expanding Anheuser-Busch,
Schlitz, Pabst, and Coors. In West Germany, in contrast, where a few
brewing groups were permitted to acquire numerous competitors, the
pace of small-plant exit has been perceptibly lower than in the United
States. 7
61. The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, which strengthened § 7 of the Clayton Act of
1914, is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
62. P. 97.
63. Pp. 96-104.
64. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
65. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-77 (1966).
66. F. SCIIERER, A. BECKENSTEIN, E. KAUFER & R. MURPHY, THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-
PLANT OPERATION: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS STUDY 248-49 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as MULTI-PLANT OPERATION]. See Burck, lWhile the Big Brewers Quaff, the Little Ones
Thirst, FORTUNE, Nov. 1972, at 102, 102-06, 178.
67. MULTI-PLANT OPEWLTION, supra note 66, at 167-68. Cf. J. Miller, The Impact of
Mergers on Concentration: A Study of Eleven West German Industries, in Proceedings of
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Even when it retards the erosion of small firms' positions, a policy
that opposes mergers because they enhance the efficiency of the
merged enterprise rubs against the grain of most economists' instincts,
including mine. Yet, as Posner acknowledges,68 Congress did express
its desire to preserve small business in passing the Celler-Kefauver Act.
No matter how strongly one may object to this criterion on the basis
of logic or one's own value preferences, it seems inappropriate for
either the antitrust enforcement agencies or the courts to subvert
legislative intent, even when it forces decisionmakers to try to satisfy
conflicting policy goals.
I believe, however, that the conflict between efficiency and small-
business preservation is not really so acute. Here arises my strongest
criticism of both the Supreme Court and Posner. In Brown Shoe, the
Court seemed to accept the view that the merger of Brown and Kinney
would lead to enhanced efficiency and lower prices to consumers.
Peterman states that the trial record contained no substantial evidence
of such efficiencies.09 I have not read the record, but I would go
further. My colleagues and I studied multiplant and vertical integra-
tion economies in the shoe industry and found that at best slight
advantages are likely to be realized by a merger of firms the size of
Brown and Kinney.70 In other words, the efficiency threat to small
business feared by the Supreme Court was, in that specific case, most
likely a mere illusion.
Professor Posner's error is more general and hence more egregious
than the Supreme Court's in this respect. Underlying his opposition
to Celler-Kefauver Act enforcement is his belief that
[a]n antimerger law is bound to be a very costly method of deal-
ing with collusion ... because mergers that may be held to violate
the law may serve to exploit economies of scale sooner than by
internal expansion, to concentrate assets in the hands of superior
managers, and (where merger occurs pursuant to a takeover bid)
to punish inefficient or corrupt managers.7 1
the First International Institute of Management Conference on Economics of Industrial
Structure 241, 268 (Deidesheim, W. Germany, 1974) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (small,
inefficient, local breweries "survive comfortably").
68. P. 99.
69. Peterman, The Brown Shoe Case, 18 J.L. & ECON. 81, 106-17 (1975).
70. MULTI-PLANT OPERATION, supra note 66, at 237-354. For a more detailed discussion
of the vertical integration effects, see F.M. Scherer, Economies of Scale at the Plant and
Multi-Plant Levels: Detailed Evidence 180-81 (1975) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
71. P. 96. See pp. 16, 111-12.
986
Vol. 86: 974, 1977
The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff
He presents no affirmative evidence to support this assertion, perhaps
because a thorough review of what is known would afford him so little
support.
There have been several studies of the Manne-Marris contention
that takeovers punish inefficient managers.72 They reveal only a weak
tendency for poorly performing firms to be taken over more frequently
than well-performing corporations. Much stronger is the tendency for
companies to escape takeovers by increasing their size-if need be
through mergers that may even reduce stockholder welfare. Several
other studies uniformly show that most sizeable mergers are followed
by relatively insignificant operational changes directed toward en-
hancing efficiency. 73 To the extent that changes are effected, they
appear to occur least frequently in the production area and most
frequently in finance and accounting, with marketing changes (on
which I shall comment from a different perspective later) occupying
an intermediate position. Complementing this case-study evidence is
a substantial body of statistical analysis revealing little if any system-
atic increase in postmerger as compared to premerger profitability.
74
In short, although exceptions surely exist, most mergers at a scale
large enough to attract antitrust attention yield inappreciable ef-
72. See R. MARRIS, THE EcONoMIc THEORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITALISM 1-45 (1964);
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POLITICAL ECON. 110 (1965).
For tests of the Marris-Manne hypothesis, see D. KUEHN, TAKEOVERS AND THE THEORY OF
THE FIRM: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM 1957-1969 (1975); A. SINGH,
TAKE-OVERS: THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE STOCK MARKET AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (1971);
Hindley, Separation of Ownership and Control in the Modern Corporation, 13 J.L. &
EcON. 185 (1970); Kuehn, Stock Market Valuation and Acquisitions: An Empirical Test of
One Component of Managerial Utility, 17 J. INDUS. ECON. 132 (1969); Singh, Take-Overs,
Economic Natural Selection, and the Theory of the Firm: Evidence from the Postwar
United Kingdom Experience, 85 EcoN. J. 497 (1975); Smiley, Tender Offers, Transactions
Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 58 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 22 (1976); and Singh, Book
Review, 14 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 505 (1976).
73. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, CONGLOMERATE MERGER PERFOR-
MANCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NINE CORPORATIONS 33-54 (1972); G. NEWBOULD,
MANAGEMENT AND NIERGER ACTIVITY 162-69 (1970); MULTI-PLANT OPERATION, supra note
66, at 161-68 (in half of 36 cases mergers were followed by substantial actions to ration-
alize combined operations); Kitching, Why Do Mergers Miscarry?, 45* HARv. BUS. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1967, at 84, 87-90.
74. See H. ANSOFF, R. BRANDENBURG, F. PORTNER & R. RADOSEVICH, ACQUISITION BE-
IIAVIOR OF U.S. MIANUFACTURING FIRMS, 1946-65, at 47-89 (1971); FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION STAFF REPORT, supra note 73, at 55-58; H. LYNCH, FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF
CONGLOMERATES 277-83 (1971); S. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS, AND THE ECONOMY 153-264
(1968); A. SINGH, supra note 72, at 152-66; Conn, Acquired Firm Performance after
Conglomerate Mergers, 43 S. ECON. J. 1170 (1976); Conn, Tile Failing Firm/Industry Doc-
trines in Conglomerate Mergers, 24 J. INDUS. ECON. 181 (1976); Lev & Mandelker, The
Microeconomic Consequences of Corporate Mergers, 45 J. Bus. 85 (1972); Reid, Reply, 26
J. FINANCE 937 (1972); Singh, Take-Overs, Economic Natural Selection, and the Theory of
the Firm: Evidence from the Postwar United Kingdon Experience, 85 ECON. J. 497, 503-14
(1975); Weston & Mansinghka, Comment, 26 J. FINANCE 919 (1972).
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ficiency benefits. Much of the impetus for sizeable acquisitions ap-
pears to stem not from the quest for efficiency but from the desire to
exploit stock market disequilibria,7" to avoid double taxation of divi-
dends or reap other tax advantages, 7T to enhance size and diversifica-
tion and hence to present a more attractive picture to investors, T7 or
perhaps simply to build an empire. The stock market advantages, I
have argued elsewhere,78 are largely redistributive. To the extent that
there are allocative efficiency benefits through genuine risk reduction
to stockholders, the same effect should be attainable through the en-
couragement of more competitive mutual funds using the portfolio
selection methods suggested by modern finance theory in place of
costly high-turnover strategies. Efficiency gains attributable to tax
advantages ought also to be fostered directly through tax reform rather
than through the second-best medium of mergers.
I believe this necessarily oversimplified summary of the evidence,
which suggests that mergers seldom yield significant efficiencies, is
nearer the truth than Posner's conclusory assertion to the contrary. At
the same time I agree with Posner that most sizeable mergers of recent
American experience, including those that have been attacked by the
antitrust agencies, have tended to have only minor anticompetitive
effects. If I am right, mergers contribute little in general either to
efficiency or to monopoly. They are a deadly serious but preponder-
antly sterile game that diverts managerial attention from running
existing operations well.
To the extent that such a low-level balance of monopoly costs and
efficiency benefits prevails, the injection into federal merger policy of
noneconomic goals, such as the desire for maximum decentralization of
power, seems to me entirely appropriate. I would make the decentrali-
zation goal decisive with respect to quantitatively substantial horizon-
tal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers in the absence of probable ef-
ficiency gains, and I would place the burden of proving efficiency gains
or other compelling advantages on the would-be merger partners, en-
forcing a hold-separate order until that burden is borne. If it is borne,
the hold-separate order would be removed unless the Government
presents affirmative evidence of probable anticompetitive effects. Thus,
75. See Gort, An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers, 83 Q.J. ECON. 624 (1969).
76. See P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFEcTS, POLICIES 75-95 (1975).
77. See Lintner, Expectations, Mergers and Equilibrium in Purely Competitive Securi-
ties Markets, in Papers and Proceedings of the 83d Annual Meeting of the American
Economic Association, 61 AM. ECON. REV., May 1971, at 101, 107-10.
78. Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 110-12 (1976) (F.M. Scherer).
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my analysis, unlike Posner's, leads to a recommendation for toughen-
ing § 7 of the Clayton Act rather than eliminating it. Obviously, any
reform is unlikely to happen without a clear restatement by Congress
of what goals it wishes to stress. Until then, the antitrust agencies and
courts will continue bumbling along, interpreting as best they can
their ambiguous and contradictory mandate.
IV. The Substance of Antitrust: Monopolization and Divestiture
In part for reasons similar to those underlying his approach to
mergers, Professor Posner takes a dim view of proposals to break up
large firms under § 2 of the Sherman Act.7 9 Besides favoring a direct
attack on collusive price raising, he highlights the difficulties en-
countered in securing divestiture through antimonopolization suits.
His review of § 2 cases reveals, not surprisingly, relatively few in which
substantial divestiture was ordered and even fewer in which the divesti-
ture had a clearly favorable impact on competition. 0 He also observes
that "[a]ny proceeding to deconcentrate an industry.., would probably
be cumbersome, protracted, and indeed unmanageable.""'
Posner goes on to argue that, even if the procedural nut could be
cracked, "deconcentration might impose heavy costs on society by
requiring industries to operate with higher costs." 8 2 Rejecting the
Neal Report's suggestion 3 that such losses be avoided by permitting
respondent companies to defend themselves by showing that divestiture
would cause substantial scale economy sacrifices, Posner asserts that
[t]here is no accepted method of establishing "directly" the exis-
tence of economies of scale at either the plant or the firm level.
The methods that have been used (mostly engineering cost studies)
79. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975). See p. 78 & n.1.
80. Pp. 84-86. One must dispute his conclusion, however, that the divestiture resulting
from the Alcoa decision, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945), was "trivial." P. 84 n.9. Aluminium Ltd. of Canada was hardly a "minor
subsidiary" (id.)-it had sales 2.6 times Alcoa's in 1948 and has been a recurrent com-
petitive thorn in Alcoa's side since then. Likewise, the "creation and rapid expansion of
competing aluminum producers" (p. 88) following World War II was hardly unrelated
to the 1945 decision, since Alcoa was deliberately excluded from the bidding for surplus
war plants. See M. PECK, COMPETITION IN THE ALUMINUM INDUsTRY: 1945-1958, at 11-19
(1961). Similarly, Posner's statement at p. 86 that following the Standard Oil divestiture,
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), "there was at first little competition
among the companies" (emphasis added) sluffs off a fair amount of important subsequent
regional market interpenetration.
81. P. 79. See pp. 1001-02 infra (discussion of possible procedural reforms).
82. P. 89.
83. White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy (1968), reprinted in 2 ANTI-
TRusT L. & EcoN. REV., Winter 1968-69, at 11, 30.
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suffer from grave conceptual shortcomings and are, in any event,
probably insufficiently developed to generate evidence assimilable
in a legal proceeding. 4
In support he cites two authorities. Checking the first, I found that
the author did identify certain limitations of engineering cost studies
but was on the whole quite positive toward their use, concluding,
inter alia, that "this exact use opens exciting new vistas for the further
study of economies of scale."8 The other authority was Professor
McGee's half of a debate on scale economies-the uncited half being
my own paper that reached a rather different conclusion."0 The most
I can say under these circumstances is that Posner has not exactly told
his readers the whole story.
Posner's argument also suffers from internal inconsistencies. Sixteen
pages after asserting that evidence of scale economies is not assimilable
in a legal proceeding, he cites the record of the Von's Grocery case as
indicating "that a modern supermarket able to compete on terms of
substantial equality with the leading firms in the market could be
started with a capital investment of only $700,000. ' s7 Apparently, such
evidence is probative only when it supports the conclusion Posner
wishes to draw. From my own experience, including nearly five years
using the engineering method in an international study of scale econ-
omies in 12 industries,88 I would argue that it is much easier to
identify the size-related sources of efficiency, determine the minimum
efficient scale of operations, and estimate the cost disadvantages borne
by smaller plants or firms, than it is to ascertain whether prices have
been elevated unreasonably. Here Posner and I appear to disagree
profoundly.
He comes nearer the jugular of structural antitrust in posing a
decidedly nonrhetorical question: "Ask yourself how it is that an in-
dustry becomes, and remains, highly concentrated, notwithstanding
that it is presumed to be charging supra-competitive prices .... so
Specifically, if prices are held above costs and if there are no valid
unexpired patents or other governmental monopoly power grants, why
84. Pp. 89-90 (footnote omitted).
85. Smith, Survey of the Empirical Evidence on Economies of Scale, in NATIONAL
BUREAU COMMITrEE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY
222 (1955).
86. McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: TIE NEW
LEARNING 55 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as NEw
LEARNING]; Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in id. at 16.
87. P. 106.
88. MULTI-PLANT OPERATON, supra note 66.
89. P. 91.
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do the high prices not attract new entrants and the expansion of
smaller existing rivals, sooner or (as in the case of United States Steel)
later eroding the monopoly power base? A full chapter is devoted to
one often-suggested answer-exclusionary practices by the monopolistic
firm or group. Here Posner continues to ask many of the right con-
ceptual questions and, with the notable exception of some confusion
over the relationship between long-run and short-run marginal cost
curves, 90 he shows good insight into the relevant static economic
theory.'
Much less satisfactory is his handling of the case evidence. For
example, reviewing the Telex case,92 he argues that Telex's entry into
the plug-compatible peripherals business rendered IBM's dominant-
firm residual-demand function more elastic, whereupon IBM's short-
run profit-maximizing price fell.93 From this proposition, which even
in extreme cases is theoretically unexceptionable, 94 he concludes that
"IBM was adjusting in a natural and socially appropriate manner to
the erosion of its monopoly position."0' 5 But how does one reconcile
this benign explanation with the fact that IBM set up a task force to
evaluate peripheral manufacturers' costs, that the task force found
(perhaps erroneously) Telex's zero-profit point to be a monthly rental
of $381 per disk drive unit, and that two months later IBM announced
a fighting machine (my own interpretive phrase) priced at $333 per
90. Thus, he states at p. 191 as a "fact" that "short-run marginal cost is lower than
long-run marginal cost .. . even when there is no excess capacity." This is unambigu-
ously wrong.when one takes Professor Stigler's preferred definition of "capacity," and is
correct only for an implausible special case when the less-preferred definition is adopted.
G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 156-158 (3d ed. 1966). With the preferred definition,
short-run marginal cost equals long-run marginal cost by definition at capacity operation
and exceeds it when the enterprise is running above capacity. When "capacity" is de-
fined as the output at which short-run average total cost is minimized, short-run
marginal cost can be below long-run marginal cost without excess capacity only if the
enterprise is operating in the rising range of its long-run average-cost curve. It is not
clear how firms could survive in a competitive industry under such conditions, and it is
even less clear why they would engage in arguably predatory price cutting to become
even larger and hence experience even more severe cost disadvantages. Posner apparently
goes astray by forgetting that short-run marginal costs must rise as capacity operation is
approached.
91. He seems unaware of relevant dynamic theory developments. See, e.g., Gaskins,
Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing under Threat of Entry, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 306
(1971); Kamien & Schwartz, Limit Pricing and Uncertain Entry, 39 EcoNoaMiETcA 441
(1971); Lee, Oligopoly and Entry, 11 J. EcoN. THEORY 35 (1975).
92. Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973),
rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
93. P. 195.
94. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REy.
869, 875-80 (1976).
95. P. 194.
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drive?9 How does one explain the fact that the fighting machine was
merely a repackaged version of an earlier disk drive, which IBM con-
tinued to lease at substantially higher rentals to less mobile or cost-
conscious customers? 9 How does one explain IBM's subsequent "term
lease plan," carefully designed to impose losses on plug-compatible
manufacturers (PCMs), leaving a situation projected as follows in an
IBM staff memo: "PCM corporate revenues lower-no funds for mfg.,
eng.-dying company!"? 9 s
Posner simply ignores facts inconsistent with his innocent rationali-
zation. To be sure, IBM evidently continued to earn a profit on its
repriced disk drives, suggesting (with certain qualifications too com-
plex to explore here) that Telex and other PCM firms were less
efficient and, arguably, deserved no protection from IBM's alleged
predation. Yet one cannot legitimately stop there. One must ask why
the PCM firms' costs were higher: because of unavoidable inefficien-
cies or because the PCMs had not yet achieved sufficient volume to
realize foreseeably attainable scale economies. If the latter, I would
argue that IBM's continued profitability should not negate an in-
ference of predation. 99 None of these criticisms lessens the basic dilem-
ma to which Professor Posner appropriately points: If IBM failed to
cut prices, it would lose market position and be criticized (but per-
haps, like United States Steel, not convicted) for being a sluggish
monopolist; if it did react by cutting prices, it rendered itself vulner-
able to antitrust suits. But neither truth nor equity is served by over-
looking material facts, as Posner does, and making the dilemma's
resolution seem simple when it is not.
Similarly, in analyzing the United Shoe Machinery case,10 Posner
skillfully picks apart, one at a time, the exclusionary practices cited by
the court as evidence of monopolistic intent. He concludes that no
96. See G. BROCK, THE U.S. COMPUTER INDUSTRY 116 (1975) (relying on Telex record).
97. Id. at 116-17.
98. Id. at 121 (quoting Telex record).
99. See Scherer, supra note 94, at 887-89. In a footnote to his Telex discussion, p.
195 n.39, Posner seems to embrace the latter explanation, for he states that "in general,
the long-run marginal costs of potential entrants will be the same as the long-run
marginal cost of the monopoly seller." In other words, if permitted time to win a
sufficient volume of orders, Telex could have become as efficient as IBM. In private
correspondence with me, Posner has denied that this is his view. He argues that Telex
must have been an exception to his general case, for if it did have the same long-run
marginal-cost curve as IBM, it would have expanded its output to achieve all economies
of scale. This argument sweeps away all the interesting dynamic questions of how one
achieves a least-cost volume of output quickly enough to avoid being vulnerable during
the transition to larger scale.
100. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af!'d
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). See pp. 202-07.
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single practice could have sustained United's alleged monopoly posi-
tion. But he does not consider whether the practices may have in-
teracted to render entry difficult. Thus, he argues that United's
10-year lease policy could be surmounted if a rival manufacturer lined
up customers in advance of their lease expiration dates, with roughly
10% of the market exposed to such capture each year.' 0 ' But Posner
fails to mention the full-capacity clause in United's leases, under
which lessees were normally required to use their United machines to
full capacity before utilizing any other equipment. 0 2 This plus stag-
gered expiration dates plus fluctuations in the level of capacity utiliza-
tion plus learning-by-doing efficiencies could clearly render entry diffi-
cult for equally efficient competitive machines, which might stand idle
in all but peak-load periods. 10 3 Posner also fails to consider the signif-
icance of the natural and patent barriers to broad-line new entry when
viewed in conjunction with the vulnerability of firms attempting to
enter the market with a narrow product line.'0 4 Narrow-line entrants
had to face United's demonstrated price discrimination by machine
type, as well as the higher travel costs and greater delays necessary to
provide repair service comparable to United's bundled broad-line
service. To ignore such interactions is to miss the crux of United's
business policies.
These may be extreme cases, however, and Posner's critical focus on
them may reflect no more than their visibility. A more important
question is whether Posner's proposed inaction with respect to struc-
tural monopoly can survive analysis on its own merits. I therefore turn
from criticism of the case law to consideration of broader policy issues.
It is no secret that in recent years the FTC has sought to deal with
monopolization and tight-knit oligopoly problems under § 5 of the
101. P. 203. Independent evidence shows that multiple units of many machines are
used in the typical shoemaking plant. C. PRATTEN & R. DEAN, THE ECONOMIES OF LARGE-
SCALE PRODUcrION IN BRITISH INDUSTRY 44-50, 54 (1965).
102. C. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION 70, 106-07
(1956).
103. Given n machines, the n11 one has value only for peak demand situations and as
a hedge against random machine failures. If the machines are technically homogeneous,
it would not be possible normally to distinguish the marginal from particular infra-
marginal machines. But the full capacity clause does permit such differential value
imputations, making machines competitive to United's perceptibly less productive than
United machines with unexpired leases. Indeed, competitive machines must be marginal
even with respect to United machines of older vintage and inferior productivity. Further-
more, there are learning-by-doing economies in the use of shoe machinery. See C.
PR.TrEN & R. DFAN, supra note 101, at 56-57. The machine that can only be operated
when other machines are fully utilized will suffer from lower operator experience and
hence be less productive than a machine interchangeable with base-line machines.
104. See MuLTi-PLN- OPERATION, supra note 66, at 153-54 (new entrants tend to
enter in product line or geographical niches rather than on broader scale).
993
The Yale Law Journal
FTC Act. One of the most striking lessons I learned during my tenure
at the FTC was how difficult it is to find "good" monopolization
cases. By "good," I mean cases satisfying three criteria: (i) monopoly
power exists and has been demonstrably exercised; (ii) the possession
or retention of that power is attributable to something more than
superior products, service, or business acumen; 1°5 and (iii) one can
identify remedies likely to benefit the consumer.
No concise summary can possibly reflect all the considerations
relevant to finding "good" cases, but four major industry-wide in-
vestigations conducted during 1974-1976, my two years at the FTC,
illustrate the cautious attitude one develops after undertaking a care-
ful economic analysis. In the outboard marine engine industry, a near
duopoly, the leading firm had evidently tried hard to stay within the
law in the critical realm of exclusive dealerships, where scale econ-
omies severely constrained the number of potential outlets in local
markets; the leaders had done a generally good job technically in
meeting consumer demands; and divestiture would have sacrificed
modest production scale economies while making possible the creation
of at most one new competitor. In the major household appliance
(e.g., refrigerator and washing machine) industries, there were im-
pressive scale economies even at the scale of the largest seller, and
price competition remained vigorous despite high concentration.
Evidence of alleged exclusionary practices did not materialize. In
synthetic detergents, Procter & Gamble evidently owed its dominant
position and superior profitability to early and aggressive development
of the market, which gave it regional market shares facilitating the
construction of highly efficient decentralized plants. Its lower costs in
turn permitted it to maintain prices at approximately the level of
smaller rivals' long-run unit costs-not the ideal situation for con-
sumers, but arguably the best that could be accomplished under exist-
ing antitrust interpretations. Similar dynamics underlay rapidly rising
concentration in the brewing industry. As increasingly affluent con-
sumers "traded up" to premium beers, the leading companies built
modern decentralized breweries. With both cost and price advantages
over most smaller brewers, these companies squeezed the premium-
popular price differential while apparently taking pains to stay within
the bounds of relevant laws (e.g., those forbidding price discrimina-
tion). Less efficient brewers with inferior brand acceptance were driven
to the wall, while consumers benefited from relatively cheap premium
beer.
105. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 & n.7 (1966).
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Experience with these investigations reinforced my prior belief that
the links between market structure and economic performance are
complex. Unlike many Chicagoans, but like Posner (who must be
considered slightly, but tolerably, heretical by his colleagues), I con-
tinue to believe that markets can of their own accord fail, sometimes
badly.100 In my judgment, however, high concentration does not
necessarily lead to failures warranting antitrust liability. This is so for
at least three reasons. First, especially for producers' goods and in-
termediates, whose buyers are well-informed and often have some
power of their own, price competition in concentrated industries may
be a good deal more vigorous than one might anticipate on the basis
of naive oligopoly theories. 07 Second, it is clear that scale economies
and high concentration often coincide, though not on a one-to-one
basis.lus Third, even when price competition is less than ideally vigor-
ous, extreme abuses of monopoly power, manifested in either very high
prices or an oscillation between high and predatory prices, are rela-
tively uncommon-if not because such pricing policies are irrational
and fail to maximize long-run profits, then because of antitrust fears.
Rather, most dominant firms or oligopolies with exercisable monopoly
power appear to pursue some kind of a limit-pricing policy, restrain-
ing their prices to levels consistent with barriers to new entry and the
expansion of fringe firms, and thus maintaining their market posi-
tions.109
Here, in my opinion, Posner goes astray again. He expresses skep-
ticism about accepted notions of barriers to entry and limit pricing." 0
Our differences on this, partly semantic and partly substantive, are
not crucial. Much more importantly, he asserts again and again that
if a monopolist or an oligopolistic group persistently maintains its
position of dominance, it must be because of superior efficiency. Al-
though I have been unable to find an explicit definition, it seems clear
that by superior efficiency in this context (as distinguished from the
106. This seems an accurate characterization of Posner's views despite such occasional
assertions such as: "The only truly unilateral acts by which firms ,can get or keep
monopoly power are practices like committing fraud on the Patent Office or blowing up
a competitor's plant .... " P. 212.
107. For some supporting statistical evidence, see Lustgarten, The Impact of Buyer
Concentration in Manufacturing Industries, 57 REv. ECON. & STATIsICS 125 (1975).
108. See MULTI-PLANT OPERATION, supra note 66, at 222-23 (reporting correlations of
-. 46 (in untransformed terms) to -. 67 (in logarithmic form) between three-firm con-
centration ratios and the number of efficient-sized plants particular markets can ac-
commodate (an inverse index of scale economy imperatives)).
109. See note 91 supra (citing sources).
110. Pp. 92-93, 195 n.39.
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context of allocative efficiency) Posner means lower costs."' Lower
costs, however, are not the only reason why a dominant firm may
be able to preserve its dominance without resorting to predatory pric-
ing. They may not even be the most important reason. Alternatively,
a seller may enjoy an image advantage that permits it to charge a
higher price at given unit costs. Like a firm with lower unit costs than
actual or potential rivals, an enterprise enjoying such an image ad-
vantage can pursue a pricing strategy that yields both a stable market
share and continuing supranormal profits.
Posner seems to believe that such image advantages map one-to-one
into costs: a price premium associated with a favorable image requires
exactly offsetting advertising or other product-differentiation costs. 11"2
His error on this point, if it be that, is understandable, for much of
the direct evidence on product-differentiation barriers to entry has
been anecdotal, confused, or both. Two new studies, however, provide
fresh insights that, I suspect, will prove to be rather general. A
statistical investigation of promotion and pricing in the oral diuretic
and antianginal drug markets revealed that firms that had played an
innovative or pioneering role were able to maintain both higher prices
(indeed, three to seven times those of me-too drugs) and lower long-run
unit promotional costs while retaining high market shares." 3 More
generally, an analysis by Professors Buzzell and Farris,"14 using un-
usually detailed data on 103 narrowly defined company operating
units, disclosed that having been a pioneer in a consumer goods market
permitted an average saving on advertising-plus-sales-promotion out-
lays of 1.45 cents per sales dollar relative to early nonpioneer sellers.
Late entrants, by contrast, had to spend 2.12 cents more than early
nonpioneer sellers, all else equal.
Until recently I thought such relationships might be attributable to
advertising scale economies, i.e., pioneers simply hold larger market
shares and reap the cost advantages. 115 But the Buzzell-Farris study
111. See pp. 92, 112.
112. Pp. 92-93, 119 n.55. One is inclined to dismiss as advocate's rhetoric Posner's
argument that if Procter & Gamble were really "more efficient than any firm in the
liquid bleach market" (p. 118 n.54) and hence able "to underprice the existing producers
there-including Clorox" (p. 118), it would "enter the market internally and destroy its
feeble competitors" (id.), achieving "a monopoly position," (id.).
113. FEDERAL TRADE COMM,'N STAFF, SALES, PROMOTION, AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
IN Two PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETS 19-27, 45-46, 70-77 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FTC
REPORT].
114. R. Buzzell & P. Farris, Marketing Costs in Consumer Goods Industries, at 8
(Marketing Sci. Inst. Rep. No. 76-111, Aug. 1976) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
115. See MULTI-PLANT OPERATION, supra note 66, at 245-53; Scherer, supra note 70, at
61-63.
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explicitly controlled for this additional variable and the "firstness"
relationship persisted. Evidently, there is an interaction effect between
firstness and subsequent ability to spend less per unit on promotion
while maintaining elevated prices and a sizeable market share. First-
ness in this respect may be associated with technological innovation
and the early introduction of physically superior product features. But
it may also stem solely from marketing innovation. Thus, Warner-
Lambert did not discover or develop the leading antianginal penta-
erythritol tetranitrate; rather, it was the first to promote that un-
patented chemical entity vigorously under its own brand name. 11 It is
possible that a "fast second" technological innovation strategy accom-
panied by vigorous promotion may achieve the same effect." 7 The
main point is that early historical events, planned or accidental,
frequently confer upon firms the power persistently to raise prices by
far more than their own unit advertising costs without suffering
significant market-share erosion.
The higher price commanded by "premium image" brands may
arguably reflect superior quality and its attendant costs rather than
higher advertising costs. This is undoubtedly true in some cases, but
it clearly is not true generally. As one counterexample, there is
evidence that pioneering premium-priced antianginal drugs not only
were no more effective than dozens of cheaper chemical equivalents
but may have been no more effective in long-term therapy than a
placebo."81 Similarly, there is absolutely no reason to believe that
Clorox 5.25% liquid sodium hypochlorite bleach, priced at 63 cents
per half gallon at my neighborhood A & P in January 1977, is any
more effective than the adjacent A K- P house brand 5.25% liquid
sodium hypochlorite bleach priced at 48 cents. Double-blind experi-
ments in Sweden reportedly showed that consumers could detect taste
differences between beers but that the label affected their choices far
more potently than taste."19 It is significant that the only data request
persistently resisted by the leading American brewers in connection
with the FTC's industry-wide investigation during the early 1970s con-
cerned similar experiments. I surmise that the results, had they been
obtained, would have shown that American consumers pay their
116. FTC REPORT, supra note 113, at 37-45. Cf. M. PORTER, INTERBRAND CHOICE, STRAT-
EGY, AND BILATERAL MARKEr POWER 44-45 (1976) (on Bic's stick pen and Gillette's soft-tip
pen marketing strategies).
117. See Baldwin & Childs, The Fast Second and Rivalry in Research and Develop.
Menlt, 36 S. ECON. J. 18 (1969).
118. FTC REPORT, supra note 113, at 47-49.
119. Scherer, supra note 70, at 55 n.8.
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premium price mainly for the label rather than for the quality of the
contents.
The economic implications of heavily advertised brand names and
trademarking are now the subject of furious debate among econo-
mists. 2 0 One argument of long standing is that brand differentiation
provides incentives for quality maintenance. This is no doubt true,
but is control of a virtually generic trademark (such as Clorox or
ReaLemon), combined with heavy advertising, necessary to sustain that
incentive? In Germany "Aspirin" is a Bayer trademark; all other firms
must sell acetylsalicylic acid (usually at a substantial price discount).
Does Bayer Leverkusen in Germany strive more vigorously to maintain
the quality of its "Aspirin" than Sterling Drug (American Bayer),
Squibb, or Walgreen's in the United States? I doubt it. Why not then
permit Brown's Clorox, Smith's Clorox, and perhaps even Posner's
Clorox?1 2 ' Especially for so-called "experience goods," which are pur-
chased repeatedly, recognition that one's product is identified by
maker and that a bad consumer experience will mean lost repeat sales
should generate significant quality-control incentives. Another argu-
ment might deny that consumers can cope with such subtle distinc-
tions,122 holding instead that in a world of increasing complexity
heavily advertised brands simplify the learning on which repeat-buying
decisions are based, thereby reducing a cost that appears in no firm's
books of account-consumers' information-processing costs.
There is undoubtedly some truth also to this second argument, but
there exist several further perspectives on the advertising issue, which
is a high megatonnage time bomb with which antitrust policy must
sooner or later cope. First, no amount of semantic waffling, by
Posner 23 or anyone else, can paper over the fact that the possession of
a well-received brand image is a form of monopoly power. It permits
the firm to elevate its price over its own long-run costs, perhaps by a
substantial margin. Second, it seems to me that, at least in the con-
sumer goods industries, image advantages confer a quantitatively im-
120. See W. COMANOR & T. WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKET POWER 8-63 (1974); J.
FERGUSON, ADVERTISING AND COMPErlTION: THEORY, MEASUREMENT, FACT 15-53 (1974); J.
SIMON, ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING 167-285 (1970); Brozen, Entry Barriers:
Advertising and Product Differentiation, in NEW LEARNING, supra note 86, at 115; Mann,
Advertising, Concentration, and Profitability: The State of Knowledge and Directions for
Public Policy, in id. at 137; Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POLITICAL ECON.
729 (1974).
121. In a proposed order an FTC administrative law judge required Borden, Inc., to
license use of its ReaLemon trade name but also required licensees to disclose con-
spicuously the identity of the manufacturer or distributor. Borden, Inc., No. 8978, at 167
(Aug. 19, 1976) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as ReaLemon Order).
122. 1 say "might" because I have not seen the issue addressed squarely.
123. P. 119 n.55; see pp. 92-93.
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portant form of monopoly power-perhaps the most important.
Furthermore, for whatever reason-television, the rising complexity of
consumption, greater company sophistication in marketing, or some as
yet poorly understood factor-the problem appears to be growing. Since
World War II concentration has declined on average in producer
goods industries but increased in consumer goods industries-the more
so, the stronger the industry's propensity toward advertising-based
product differentiation.124 Third, one may well conclude that the
problem is already sufficiently serious that something should be done
about it. The monopoly price premiums associated with image ad-
vantages may be, among other things, a highly regressive tax on con-
sumers. There is reason to believe, for instance, that a higher fraction
of consumers in low-income areas than in high-income areas pay the
price premium for the dubious superiority of Wonder Bread over
private-label alternatives. The traditional remedy for such disparities
is better consumer information. Yet consumer groups, news media,
and government agencies have poured out untold quantities of in-
formation without stemming the tide of high-price brand buying. In
view of this failure, or at best limping success, one is emboldened to
seek stronger medicine: antitrust.
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that powerful trademarks
could be opened up to competitive licensing at the stroke of a judicial
pen. The benefit would presumably (although in the present state of
knowledge, not demonstrably) be lower prices and reduced outlays on
promotion. The costs would be some risk (in my judgment, slight) of
weakened quality control, some additional inspection costs to ensure
that quality standards are met,12 a possible loss of scale economies
that would be weighed in advance before trademark licensing were
decreed, an added information-processing burden on consuners, and a
certain amount of violence to traditional property rights. I believe that
in numerous cases the social benefits would outweigh the costs. A
keystone of this strong value judgment is the belief that additional
mental labor in consumption decisionmaking would not reduce na-
tional income or consumer satisfaction. Indeed, it might add spice to
life. 120 And the questions surrounding the allocation of property rights
are not unlike those considered in more than 100 compulsory patent-
124. See Mueller & Hamm, Trends in Industrial Market Concentration, 1947 to 1970,
56 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 511, 513 (1974).
125. This could be done privately without involving a government bureaucracy. See
ReaLemon Order, supra note 121, at 167-70.
126. Cf. T. SCITovsKY, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO HUMAN SATISFACrION
AND CONSUMER DISSATISFACTION 212-15, 232-36 (1976) (arguing that skill and meticulousness
in consumption should be cultivated to increase enjoyment of national income).
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licensing decrees issued by the federal courts or in foreign legislation
requiring patent licensing in certain instances. 12 7 An important open
question is whether trademark licensing should be ordered only when
classic monopolization symptoms exist, as the administrative law judge
found in the ReaLemon case,128 or, in view of the modest probable
social costs, whether such licensing should be decreed when there is
substantial monopoly power of long standing without any abusive
conduct other than elevated prices. For the latter, a congressional push
on the judicial pen may be necessary. I believe that such a step should
be seriously considered.
One further step merits attention. Although I acquired at the FTC
a healthy respect for the economic costs that would accompany divesti-
ture in certain cases, I believe there is persuasive evidence that in many
situations substantial divestiture could be accomplished with little or
no sacrifice of scale economies or other efficiencies.' 29 The brewing
industry provides a case in point. All of the leading firms but Coors
operate multiple plants. Multiplant operation appears to offer few
economic advantages in brewing other than those associated with hav-
ing and reinforcing a nationwide premium image.' 30 I once thought
the image factor was a compelling bar to structural reorganization, 13'
but at the time I failed to realize that the image obstacle could be
overcome rather simply through the cross-licensing of formulas and
trademarks among divested, regionally-specialized plants. Even after
recognizing that possibility, I opposed structural action by the FTC
because the industry was still undergoing efficiency-enhancing struc-
tural change; because the leading brewers in particular had done a
good job increasing their productive efficiency, thereby providing
consumers with cheap beer; and because, given these facts, structural
action appeared inconsistent with the intent of § 2 of the Sherman
Act, as interpreted by either Posner or me.
But some day the structural rationalization process will run its
course; the industry will be a mature, relatively tight oligopoly (or
set of regional oligopolies), and the preponderantly competitive pricing
behavior of the past may give way to something more closely resem-
127. See STAFF OF THE SUBCOIMa. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86ThI CONG., 2D SESS., COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER
ANTITRUST JUDGMENTS (1960). As has the debate over trademark licensing, such judicial
decrees have regularly been attended by predictions of economic disaster. See Wall St.
J., Jan. 27, 1956, at 6, col. 1.
128. See note 121 supra.
129. MULTI-PLANT OPERATION, supra note 66, at 332-42, 393-96.
130. Id. at 259, 334-35.
131. Id. at 395.
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bling the textbook oligopoly pattern. What then? If past structural anti-
trust enforcement traditions hold, most likely nothing. Yet the social
costs of reorganization at that stage will almost surely be small, while
the gains in terms of reinvigorated price rivalry will probably be ap-
preciable. 132 Moreover, with little or nothing to lose in the way of
efficiencies, there is much to be said for emphasizing another goal of
antitrust-the desire for maximum decentralization of economic power.
Like Posner, I do not think the enforcement agencies or the courts
should inject that goal at will into their decisionmaking. But ap-
parently unlike Posner, I approve of its inclusion. I therefore believe
that Congress should conduct a thoroughgoing review of the relevant
evidence, sort out its own thinking, and provide a clear indication of
what structural antitrust goals it wants implemented under what condi-
tions. The result might be nothing, but it might also be a radical
change in policy toward the kind of economic structure we will carry
into the 21st century.
V. Antitrust Procedure
There is a good deal more in the Posner book-e.g., on potential
competition,133 information exchanges, 134 resale-price maintenance, 3 5
and exclusive territorial restrictions. 136 Some of it is good, some not so
good. Let me end, however, on a note of harmony and commendation.
After a perceptive analysis of how the federal antitrust enforcement
bureaucracies function and malfunction, Posner points with justified
alarm to the "enormous cost of antitrust proceedings, . . . the sub-
stantial probability of error that is inherent in the unwieldy and
archaic procedures" and "[t]he monstrous, indeed grotesque, propor-
tions of the modern antitrust suit.' 1 37 To remedy matters, he proposes
that after pretrial discovery, the parties "hammer out" to the maxi-
mum degree possible a stipulated narrative of the relevant facts, leaving
132. One of the potential costs of deconcentration mentioned by Posner is the punch-
pulling, price-raising effect that fear of exceeding some actionable market share or
concentration threshold might have on leading firms. P. 94. I agree that there is a
danger. It could be minimized by giving explicit consideration in divestiture actions, as
suggested in my brewing example, to the vigor of a company's performance. Also,
divisional-level managers' competitive instincts might actually be whetted by the recogni-
tion that substantial market share gains could propel them into running their own




136. Pp. 159-63, 165-66.
137. P. 232.
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only genuinely disputed facts and principles as the focus of oral testi-
mony, document submissions, and argument. Arbitration would be
used to settle technical disputes, and fines or damage penalties would
be levied for demonstrably uncooperative behavior.
Such procedures might arguably conflict with the right to a jury
trial in criminal cases. But even if such constitutional impediments
exist, I do not consider them serious, since in my opinion the most
fruitful context for such expedited procedures would be suits at equity
to enjoin mergers or abusive practices or to dissolve objectionable con-
centrations of power, not to penalize price fixers. As suggested earlier,
it would be much easier to narrow the range of dispute on such es-
sentially objective questions as market definition, the scope of scale
economies, and the probable efficiency implications of particular
organizational arrangements than to determine whether a price has
been elevated to "unreasonable" heights. Despite Posner's argument
to the contrary, allegedly criminal price-fixing behavior could be
adjudicated under more traditional procedures. The main bar to
reform may be judges' natural fear of adverse appellate rulings if they
exercise too firm a control over trial proceedings-e.g., by ordering
capital punishment for "stonewalling" attorneys. To eliminate this
and other obstacles, I believe Congress should speak with a thundering
voice for procedural streamlining along Posnerian lines.
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